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Proposal to Amend the United States
Privacy Act to Extend Its
Protections to Foreign Nationals
and Non-Resident Aliens
I. Introduction
In 1974 Congress enacted the Privacy Act' to control the government's
collection and distribution of information about individuals and to allow
individuals to review and challenge personal data. The Privacy Act
works as a counterpart to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"),2
which allows public access to government information with the general
goal of opening the files of United States government agencies to every-
one.3 Together, the two acts encourage the legitimate use of accurate
personal information and bolster individual autonomy with respect to
the federal government.
This Note examines a troubling anomaly between the two acts.
While the FOIA grants anyone, including foreigners, general access to
the files of federal agencies, the Privacy Act protects only United States
citizens and permanent residents, excluding nonresident aliens
("aliens") and foreign nationals ("foreigners") from its protection.
Although in practice aliens and foreigners have gained access to their
personal files by resort to the FOIA, exclusion from the Privacy Act
remains significant since the latter provides numerous protections that
the FOIA does not.4 Exclusion from the Privacy Act denies aliens and
foreigners the ability to challenge errors in personal files kept by the
government. More importantly, the Privacy Act limits the government's
data collection to necessary information and regulates the maintenance
and dissemination of that information to other federal agencies. While
the FOIA and the Privacy Act are interrelated, this Note argues that
their protections are not substitutes for each other and that aliens and
foreigners should receive the protection of the Privacy Act.
This Note also compares U.S. privacy law to its counterpart data
protection legislation in other countries, arguing that the Privacy Act
1. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982)).
2. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982)).
3. See ifra note 22 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 112-119 and accompanying text.
22 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 285 (1989)
Cornell International Law Journal
should be expanded to protect aliens and foreigners so as to conform to
European laws. In general, European data protection acts protect for-
eigners as well as their citizens. Also, these data protection acts require
equivalent levels of privacy protection in other countries where informa-
tion about their citizens may be transferred. Potentially, the Privacy
Act's exclusion of foreigners could result in other countries restricting
their flow of international information to the United States.5 Trans-
border restriction of the flow of data could be detrimental to United
States commercial interests. Only by amending the Privacy Act can the
United States ensure the unrestricted flow of international information
and promote the ideal 6 that the collection, maintenance, dissemination,
review, and correction of information gathered by government agencies
should be controlled to protect all persons subject to such data
collection.
II. Historical Overview of the Privacy Act
A. General Purpose of the Privacy Act and Its Relation to the FOIA
1. The Privacy Act
The Privacy Act was enacted in response to the Watergate crisis of
1974. 7 In particular, public concern mirrored technological advances
enhancing the government's ability to compile, retrieve, analyze, and
disseminate data.8 Congress explicitly recognized that the misuse of
personal information threatened an individual's fundamental right to
5. See infra note 127.
6. Section 2 of the Public Law containing the Privacy Act states Congress' inten-
tions in passing the Act:
The privacy of an individual is directly affected by the collection, mainte-
nance, use, and dissemination of personal information by Federal agencies.
... The increasing use of computers and sophisticated information technol-
ogy, while essential to the official operations of the Government, has greatly
magnified the harm to individual privacy that can occur from any collection,
maintenance, use or dissemination of personal information. Pub. L. No. 93-
579, § 2(a), 88 Stat. 1896, 1897 (1974).
"The Privacy Act was broadly conceived as a protector of personal privacy against
government misuse of information." J. FRANKLIN & R. BOUCHARD, GUIDEBOOK TO
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACTS 2-17 (1986).
Sen. Ervin, upon introducing S. 3418, stated:
It seems that now ... the appetite of government and private organizations
for information about individuals threatens to usurp the right to privacy
which I have long felt to be among the most basic of our civil liberties as a
free people .... [T]here must be limits on what the Government can know
about each of its citizens. Each time we give up a bit of information about
ourselves to the Government, we give up some of our freedom.... Stripped
of our privacy, we lose our rights and privileges.
SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS AND THE SUBCOMM. ON GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERA-
TIONS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, S. 3418, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976), at 4 [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
7. J. FRANKLIN & R. BOUCHARD, supra note 6, at 2-15.
8. Id. See also Note, Privary Act of 1974, 1976 WAsH. U.L.Q. 667, 669-70 (1976).
A 1974 study of 54 federal agencies stated that 858 computerized data banks con-
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due process and other legal protections.9 Misuse could also affect an
individual's ability to secure employment, insurance, and credit.' 0
The Privacy Act provides that individuals may review and challenge
agency records about themselves. 1! Individuals may sue for damages in
response to intentional acts which violate the individual's rights under
the Act.' 2
The Privacy Act requires government agencies to provide adequate
safeguards to prevent misuse of personal information.' 3 They must
insure that information is accurate and current for its intended use, and
they must obtain an individual's consent before using records for any
purpose other than that for which the information was originally
obtained.' 4 Every agency maintaining a system of records must retain
only such information about an individual necessary to accomplish the
purpose of the agency as required by statute or presidential order.' 5
The Privacy Act requires agencies to collect information, to the
greatest extent possible, directly from the individual when the informa-
tion may adversely affect that individual's rights, benefits, and privileges
tained 1.25 billion records on individuals. It was estimated that the average U.S.
citizen was the subject of at least 20 records. Id. at 670.
"Increasingly, access to government benefits and services requires a willingness on
the part of individuals to divulge private information. Moreover, an observable trait
of government agencies is that when a problem is confronted, the tendency is to react
with a demand for more data .. " Note, Government Information and the Rights of Citi-
zens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971, 1223 (1975).
In 1966 a SenateJudiciary subcommittee conducted a survey of information main-
tained by government agencies and found that
federal files contained more than 3 billion records on individual citizens,
nearly one half of which were retrievable by computer, including over 27.2
billion names, 2.3 billion present and past addresses, 264 million criminal
histories, 280 million mental health records, 916 million profiles on alcohol-
ism and drug addiction, and over 1.2 billion financial records. More signifi-
cantly, the report concluded that much of the information retained was
irrelevant to agency needs and that in many instances confidentiality provi-
sions were nonexistent or not meaningful. A 1974 survey ... pointed out
that 86%o of the government data banks are computerized, and that few of the
data banks had any explicit statutory authorization for their retention of files.
Id. at 1223-24.
There are numerous examples of people being denied benefits, including employ-
ment, because of records of prior arrests which fail to show that the charges were
dropped or dismissed or that the person was found not guilty. Id. at 1229 n.1554.
A list of proposed questions for the 1970 Census included questions on religious
affiliation, registration and voting records, physical and mental handicaps, and union
membership. After much controversy and Congressional hearings, these questions
were omitted, but questions on the number of divorces, number of babies women
had, rent paid, value of houses owned, and earnings were retained. Id. at 1306.
9. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(a), 88 Stat. 1896 (1974).
10. Id. at § 2(a)(3).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (1982).
12. J. FRANKLIN & R. BOJCHARD, supra note 6, at 2-17.
13. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (1982).
14. Id. at § 552a(e)(6).
15. Id. at § 552a(e)(1).
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under federal programs.' 6 Agencies must provide to each individual
from whom it requests data the following information: the authority for
the information request; whether disclosure is mandatory or voluntary;
the principal purpose(s) for which the information is intended to be
used; the routine uses of the information; and the consequenses to the
individual, if any, of non-compliance with the information request. 17 An
agency is exempt from the Privacy Act's requirements only where there
is some important public policy need for the exemption as specified by
the Act.' 8
Clearly, the scope of the Privacy Act goes well beyond mere access
to agency records. Though non-resident aliens and foreign nationals
may gain access to agency records about themselves through the FOIA,
they nevertheless may be deprived of the basic privacy' 9 protections of
the Privacy Act.20 A review of the FOIA will show that it does not pro-
vide any of the Privacy Act protections except access to information.
The provisions of one, therefore, are an imperfect substitute for the
other.
2. The Freedom of Information Act
Enacted in 1966, the FOIA provides that any person has a right of access
to federal agency records except records that are specifically exempt. 2 1
The FOIA seeks to promote the democratic ideals of an open govern-
ment and an informed citizenry without infringing upon personal pri-
vacy, national security, or the effectiveness of the criminal investigation
system. 22 In contrast to the Privacy Act, the FOIA applies to aliens and
16. Id. at § 552a(e)(2).
17. Id. at § 552a(e)(3).
18. The Privacy Act contains general and specific exemptions. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)
and (k) (1982). The general exemptions allow the affected agencies to exempt them-
selves from most of the Act's record-keeping and access requirements. The general
exemptions cover the C.I.A. and agencies whose principal function is criminal law
enforcement, such as the F.B.I. and D.E.A. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (1982). The specific
exemptions allow agencies to deny individuals access to or the ability to require
amendments to their records, and relieves the agency of the duty to maintain only
relevant and necessary information. The specific exemptions cover classified
records, law enforcement investigatory matters other than within the general exemp-
tion, Secret Service records, statistical records, in% estigatory materials used solely for
determining qualification for federal service, test material used solely to determine
qualification/promotion for federal civilian work, and evaluation material used to
determine promotion in the armed services. 5 U.S.C. § 552(k) (1982).
19. At issue in this discussion are privacy interests relating to government
information-handling and the individual's desire to maintain anonymity with
regard to personal, identifying details. A useful definition [of privacy con-
cerning information practices], therefore, is one in which a number of writers
have concurred: the right of privacy is the right to control the flow of infor-
mation concerning the details of one's individuality-one's physical and indi-
vidual characteristics, knowledge, capabilities, beliefs, and opinions.
Note, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, supra note 8, at 1225. See id. at
1225 n. 1525 for references to definitions of privacy.
20. See infra notes 112-117 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
22. J. FRANKLIN & R. BOUCHARD, supra note 6, at 1-l i.
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foreigners as well as U.S. citizens. 23
Under the FOIA, all federal agency records are available to the pub-
lic upon request unless specifically exempt from disclosure.2 4 A person
does not have to state a reason for his or her request.2 5 The exemptions
of the FOIA are exclusive; 2 6 however, an agency may choose to disclose
information exempt from the FOIA.27 The major exemptions include
classified defense or foreign policy information, information specifically
exempted from disclosure by statute, confidential business information,
personnel files, and law enforcement investigatory records.
28
Though the purposes of the two acts are complementary, their
interaction may conflict. 29 While the FOIA provides for access to infor-
mation by anyone, the Privacy Act restricts dissemination of informa-
tion. The FOIA specifically exempts, from required disclosure,
materials "which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of per-
[T]here is no single attribute more fundamental to a democratic society
than the free flow of information .... There is another side of the issue,
however, which deserves equal respect and examination-the right of indi-
viduals to maintain personal privacy .... [Invasion of the sanctity of a per-
son's privacy will be as destructive of a society's freedom and liberty as will
the foreclosure of information about the acts of government in such a society.
Statement of Rep. Goldwater reprinted in Note, Government Information and the Rights of
Citizens, supra note 8, at 1221-22.
The longstanding tension between governmental information needs and
the desire of individuals to withhold personal, identifying details about their
lives has heightened in the last several decades due to: (1) increasing govern-
ment-individual contact resulting from increasing government regulations
and services; (2) acceptance of the theory that behavior patterns can be pre-
dicted if enough information is collected and analyzed, leading to increasing
demands for information in a wider range of areas; and (3) the computer
explosion has increased the ease of data acquisition, decreased the need to
limit data retention, and increased intra- and inter-agency transfer of
information.
Together, these three phenomena have created a spiraling demand for
information and have left us threatened with the emergence of a 'dossier
society.'
Id. at 1222-23.
23. A FOIA request can be made by "any person," 5 U.S.C. § 552a(3), as defined
in 5 U.S.C. § 551(2), which includes foreign citizens and governments. J. FRANKLIN &
R. BOUCHARD, supra note 6, at 1-18.
24. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3). See alsoJ. FRANKLIN & R. BOUCHARD, supra note 6, at 1-
11.
25. J. FRANKLIN & R. BOUCHARD, supra note 6, at 1-19.
26. Id. at 1-12. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1982). "This section does not authorize
withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as
specifically stated in this section." Id. (emphasis added).
27. J. FRANKLIN & R. BOUCHARD, supra note 6, at 1-12. See Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979) (an agency may choose to disclose information even
though it is exempt from the disclosure requirements of the FOIA).
28. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982).
29. "There is a tension between the sometimes complementary and sometimes
conflicting objectives of ... the public's right to know .... personal privacy.., and
the effective discharge of public business .. " Edelstein, Openness in Government: .4
.\eu Era, 34 FED. BARJ. 279, 281 (1975).
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sonal privacy."'30 This language suggests that in some circumstances the
protection of personal privacy may override the FOIA's goal of provid-
ing public access to information collected by the government. Because
the Privacy Act exludes foreigners and aliens, they must resort to the
FOIA to obtain information about themselves. The legislative history of
the Privacy Act provides only a brief explanation of why this anomaly
exists between the two acts.
B. The Legislative History of the Privacy Act
While the later enacted Privacy Act explicitly excludes nonresident
aliens and foreign nationals, the FOIA protections extend to these per-
sons. The Privacy Act defines an "individual" as "a citizen of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence,"'3 1 and a
"record" as any information about an individual. 32 Therefore the Pri-
vacy Act allows only citizens and permanent residents to gain access to
agency records containing information about themselves. 3 3 In contrast,
the FOIA applies to any "person," 3 4 defined to include foreign citizens
and foreign governments, as well as corporations, partnerships, and
associations. 35
Senator Ervin introduced the privacy bill in the Senate on May 1,
1974.36 The Senate bill originally provided protection for foreigners as
30. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982).
31. Id. at § 552a(a)(2).
32. The Privacy Act defines a "record" as:
any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is
maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to his education, finan-
cial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and
that contains his name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identify-
ing particular assigned to the individual, such as finger or voice print or a
photograph.
Id. at § 552a(a)(4).
33. Id. at § 552a(d)(1).
34. Id. at § 552(a)(3).
35. J. FRANKLIN & R. BOUCHARD, supra note 6, at 1-14. See Doherty v. U.S. Dept.
ofJustice, 596 F. Supp. 423, 427 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). While nonresident aliens and
foreign nationals are not within the scope of the Privacy Act, thev' have considerable
access to a broader category of records under the FOIA than they would through the
Privacy Act. SeeJ. FRANKLIN & R. BOUCHARD, supra note 6, at 1-14.
36. S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in SoURcEnooK, supnra note 6, at
9-28. The bill was much broader in scope than the Privacy Act as finally enacted.
The initial Senate bill would have established a Federal Privacy Board to oversee the
collection and disclosure of information concerning individuals and to provide infor-
mation management systems. Id. at 9. In a compromise with the House of Repre-
sentatives, the Senate eliminated the Privacy Board and rendered the Privacy Act less
helpful to individuals, especially in light of the Act's ineffective judicial remedies pro-
vision. Supra note 8, at 718.
The failure to provide for an independent commission to aid in the enforce-
ment of the Act was inexcusable. The Act places responsibility for assuring
agency compliance almost exclusively upon the individual, but gives him
neither the tools nor the incentive to do so.
No one, however, wants to repeat the experience of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act in holding out rights to individuals but providing them with only
a costly and cumbersome mechanism of a judicial remedy. Therefore we
Vol. 22
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well as U.S. citizens. 3 7 The bill applied to "data subjects" rather than
"individuals" and defined a data subject as "an individual about who
[sic] personal information is indexed or may be located.., in any infor-
mation system."'38 After undergoing extensive revision,39 the bill
emerged from the Senate Committee on Government Operations apply-
ing only to U.S. citizens and permanent residents.4 0 The record of the
Committee mark-up session, prior to the Senate vote on the bill, does
not mention the change.4 1
The only explanation for the Privacy Act's restrictive definition of
individual is found in the Committee Report accompanying the Senate
bill:
The term "individual" means a citizen of the United States or an
alien lawfully admitted throughout permanent residence. This term is
used instead of the term "person" throughout the bill in order to ...
exempt [from] the coverage of the bill intelligence files and data banks
devoted solely to foreign nationals or maintained by the State Depart-
ment, the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies for the purpose
of dealing with nonresident aliens and people in other countries.
4 2
Interpretting the above language, the Office of Management and Budget
("OMB") Guidelines on the Privacy Act state that files solely related to
nonresident aliens are not covered by any portion of the Act. In addi-
tion, in records systems which cover both citizens and aliens, only that
portion relating to citizens or permanent residents is protected. How-
would amend the bill to provide for the establishment of an administrative
body to mediate conflicts between agencies and individuals, to investigate
complaints, hold hearings, and make findings of fact.... Only by providing
a separate administrative agency with authority for implementing legislation
and coordinating the privacy programs of the various Federal agencies can
we be assured of unified effective enforcement of the rights guaranteed by
this bill.
Id. Oversight of the Privay Act of 1974: Hearings Before the Subcornm. of the House Conn. on
Government Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 193 (1983) [hereinafter Hearings].
37. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 13-14.
Any Federal agency, State or local government, or other organization
maintaining an information system that includes personal information shall
• . .afford any data subject of a foreign nationality, whether residing in the
United States or not, the same rights under this Act as are afforded to citizens
of the United States.
Id.
The legislative history fails to explain why the bill initially included foreigners.
The ultimate revision of the Act to exclude foreigners is only very briefly explained.
See i fra note 42 and accompanying text.
38. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 25.
39. Mark-Up Session on S. 3418, Aug. 20, 1974 reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 6, at 43 (refers to the Committee taking up Confidential Committee Print No.
5).
40. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 145.
41. Mark-Up Session on S. 3418, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 29-
96.
42. SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, PROTECTING INDIVIDUAl, PRI-
VACY IN FEDERAL GATHERING, USE AND DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION, S. REP. No.
1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1975), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 232.
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ever, the Guidelines do encourage agencies to treat such systems as if
they were, in their entirety, covered by the Act.4 3
Representative Moorhead introduced a substantially different pri-
vacy bill shortly after the Senate bill was introduced.4 4 The House bill
defined an individual as a citizen or lawfully permanent resident. 4 5 The
Report of the House Committee on Government Operations states only
that the House Privacy Act "would not affect any . . . foreign
nationals." '4 6
The Senate and House versions differed both in structure and in
content.4 7 Rather than working out these differences in a formal confer-
ence, Congress was determined to pass some form of privacy legislation
before the end of the session.48 Therefore, the leading congressional
proponents of the bills met informally to draft a compromise bill. Presi-
dent Ford signed the Privacy Act into law on December 31, 1974. 4 9
C. Judicial Interpretation of "Individuals" Protected
by the Privacy Act
There is little judicial interpretation of the meaning, scope, or applica-
tion of the Privacy Act. Courts have generally considered the Act as
clearly defining an "individual." 50 In Raven v. Panama Canal Co.,51 the
Fifth Circuit held that a Panamanian citizen was not an individual under
the Privacy Act and therefore could not compel access to information
43. OMB Privacy Act Guidance, reprinted in Hearings, supra note 36, at 352.
44. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 239-57
45. Id. at 241-42.
46. Id. at 304.
47. While the Senate version created a permanent Privacy Protection Commis-
sion, the House bill did not. The compromise was a temporary Privacy Protection
Study Commission. Another difference was that the Senate bill restricted agency
releases of information more tightly than the House bill, which permitted dissemina-
tion if it was a routine use of the data by the agency. Again, the House version was
followed. There where further compromises on the relevance and accuracy of the file
information, and the scope ofjudicial review available to individuals. In general, the
less stringent House bill was adopted. J. FRANKLIN & R. BOUCHARD, supra note 6, at 2-
16.
48. While the Watergate scandal prompted passage of the Privacy Act, impeach-
ment hearings also preoccupied the Senate and left little time for legislation until the
closing months of the 93d Congress. Congress did not seriously consider privacy
legislation until four months before adjournment. The Senate and House bills were
not passed until late November. The 93d Congress considered several bills concern-
ing personal privacy, indicating Congress's strong reaction to the illegal wiretapping
and surveillance aspects of Watergate. J. FRANKLIN & R. BOUCHARD, supra note 6, at
2-18 to 2-22.
Professor Flaherty states: "The compromise was a product of pressures on Con-
gressional time, the desire to pass some privacy legislation in the wake of the Water-
gate affair, the desire to honor Senator Ervin in his last term, resistance to the
creation of more bureaucracies, and the risk of a Presidential veto." Hearings, supra
note 36, at 196.
49. J. FRANKLIN & R. BOUCHARD, supra note 6, at 2-17.
50. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
51. 583 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1978).
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about herself.52 The court stated that Congress' different treatment of
aliens and citizens did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because a
legitimate distinction exists between those groups. 53 Raven referred to
Stone v. Export-Import Bank of United States,54 an FOIA case which, in dicta,
distinguished the FOIA's broad definition of person from the Privacy
Act's narrower definition of individual.5 5 Both courts cited legislative
history5 6 to demonstrate a congressional intent to exclude foreign
nationals and resident aliens from the protection of the Privacy Act. 57
D. Congressional Review of the Privacy Act
In June, 1983, the House Government Operations Committee ("the
Committee") held the first hearings on the oversight of the Privacy Act
since the Act became effective. 58 These hearings followed shortly after
the introduction of several House bills aimed at limiting public access to
government records. 59 The Committee was particularly concerned with
the possibility of restrictions on international data flow. Such restric-
tions, it was feared, might result in United States companies losing busi-
ness opportunities in the lucrative markets for data processing and
information services because other countries would view United States
privacy law as deficient. 60
The Committee addressed the international implications of recent
52. Id. at 170.
53. Id. at 171 (referring to Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-79 (1976)). The
court also held that the equal protection clause does not require extension of all
Privacy Act rights to Panamanian employees of the Canal Zone. Raven, 583 F.2d at
171.
54. 552 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1977).
55. Id. at 136-37.
56. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
57. Raven v. Panama Canal Co., 583 F.2d 169, 171 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Flor-
ida Medical Ass'n v. Dept. of Health, Ed. and Welfare, 479 F. Supp. 1291, 1307 (M.D.
Fl. 1979). In a more recent FOIA case, Doherty v. United States Dept. ofJustice, 596
F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the district court implied that Congress offered little
reason to distinguish the different treatment of foreigners in FOIA from that of the
Privacy Act. Id. at 426 ("Upon comparing the text of the FOIA with the text of the
Privacy Act, this Court believes that the Congress,for whatever reasons of its own, was
aware of the difference between the terms 'person' and 'citizen,' and intentionally
chose the former for the FOIA and the latter for the Privacy Act.") (emphasis added).
Id.
58. Hearings, supra note 36.
59. See H.R. 4805, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 1730, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982) (as reported by the Senate Committee on the judiciary), and S. REP. No. 690,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
60. Hearings, supra note 36, at 1-4 ("Other countries that have recently found the
need to enact laws protecting privacy have done so through comprehensive data pro-
tection laws. Some of these nations are now reluctant to send information outside of
their own borders if the legal protections afforded the information will be dimin-
ished. As a result United States companies may find that they are shut out of lucra-
tive markets for data processing and information services because of a perception
that U.S. privacy laws are inadequate."). Id. at 4. The Committee noted that the
Privacy Act's record-keeping requirements have had a much greater impact than the
Act's access provisions, which largely duplicate those of the FOIA. Id. at 3.
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attempts to exclude foreign nationals from the FOIA.6 1 The Committee
Report6 2 stated that the Privacy Act's exclusion of foreign nationals is
insignificant 68 since those people can use the FOIA to obtain records
about themselves. 64 The Committee, however, also recognized that if
the FOIA were restricted in the same way as the Privacy Act, foreign
nationals would have no access to government information about them-
selves. 6 5 The Committee therefore found that restricting the FOIA
without correspondingly expanding the Privacy Act "would be received
negatively abroad and could result in a reciprocal loss of rights [to]
United States citizens."'6 6 The Committee recommended that efforts to
constrict the FOIA should be reconsidered. 67
Apparently, the sponsors of the bills to restrict the FOIA had not
considered international reaction to an FOIA amendment denying for-
eigners the Act's protection. 68 The Committee contacted the Office of
Management and Budget, the agency designated to oversee the Privacy
Act,69 which admitted that none of the agencies it contacted had consid-
ered the political implications abroad. 70 OMB informed the Committee
that if the FOIA was amended to restrict use by aliens and foreigners,
then the United States Trade Representative and the State Department
61. See S. REP. No. 690, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) to accompany S. 1730. "The
bill would limit the use of FOIA to 'U.S. Persons,' " but the paragraph describing the
regulatory impact of the bill states that the amendment will "improve personal pri-
vacy protections for every individual about whom the Government maintains infor-
mation." Id. at 2. The Report does not provide any explanation for the reasons
behind the proposed restriction to U.S. persons.
62. H.R. REP. No. 455, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
63. Christopher DeMuth, Administrator of OMB's Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, testified at the Oversight Hearings that in a three year span, agen-
cies received over two million Privacy Act requests from individuals for access to
their records, of which 96 percent were granted. Hearings, supra note 36, at 73.
64. Hearings, supra note 36, at 32-33.
65. H.R. REP. No. 455, supra note 62, at 36.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 37.
68. Id. at 33. "There is no indication that, when the Reagan Administration pro-
posed amending the Freedom of Information Act, it gave any consideration to the
international consequences of cutting off the ability of foreigners to use the law to
protect privacy interests." Id.
69. Id. at 6; see also Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 6, 88 Stat. 1909 (1974).
70. H.R. REP. No. 455, supra note 62, at 33 n.228.
The OMB answered the Subcommittee's questions:
QUESTION: Foreigners have no access and correction rights under the Pri-
vacy Act. However foreigners may seek access to records under the Freedom
of Information Act. The Reagan Administration has proposed legislation
that would deny foreigners the use of the FOIA. Has anyone in the Adminis-
tration considered how such a change in the FOIA might be received in
Europe? If so, please provide documentation.
ANSWER: None of the agencies we contacted indicated that the subject had received
specific consideration, but both the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and
the Department of State suggested that such an exclusion might be received
negatively.
Hearings, supra note 36, Appendix 8, at 600 (emphasis added).
Vol. 22
1989 Privacy Act
favored extending the Privacy Act to aliens and foreigners. 7 1 Such an
expansion of the Privacy Act would bring it more in line with European
data protection acts.
III. Comparison of the Privacy Act to Data Protection Legislation in
Other Countries
A. General Purpose and the Council of European Data Protection
Convention
In Europe, data protection acts confer protections and serve purposes
similar to the United States Privacy Act.72 In general, European data
protection laws allow foreign citizens to access, inspect, and challenge
data bases. 73 The Council of European Data Protection Convention 74
("the Convention") requires member States to provide persons residing
abroad with both access rights to personal information 75 and assistance
in the exercise of those rights.7 6
The Convention requires comprehensive national data protection
laws as a prerequisite to ratification. 77 Because the United States data
protection laws do not meet European standards, the United States is
ineligible to join the Convention at this time.7 8 Moreover, the Conven-
tion authorizes party nations to restrict transborder data flows to non-
71. Hearings, supra note 36, Appendix 8.
OMB's response stated: "Assuming the passage of the FOIA amendments [restrict-
ing foreigners], opening the Privacy Act to foreigners would bring US. privacy laws
back into line with foreign data protection laws" Id. (emphasis added).
72. R. ALDRICH, PRIVACY PROTECTION LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, N.T.I.A. Report 82-98 (1982)), reprinted in Hearings, supra note
36, at 490.
73. Hearings, supra note 36, at 251. Swedish, West German and British laws pro-
tect foreign citizens. Only Canada denies data protection to foreigners. Id.
74. The Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, is an international agreement
whose purpose "is to strengthen data protection, i.e. the legal protection of individu-
als with regard to automatic processing of personal information relating to them."
COUNCIL OF EUROPE EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION
OF INDIVIDUALS WITH REGARD TO AUTOMATIC PROCESSING DATA 5 (1981) [hereinafter
COUNCIL OF EUROPE EXPLANATORY REPORT]. The Convention binds ratifying coun-
tries and requires comprehensive national data protection laws as a prerequisite to
ratification. It contains provisions authorizing ratifying countries to restrict trans-
border data flows to non-member nations. Yurow, Data Protection, in TOWARD A LAW
OF GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS 241 (A. Branscomb ed. 1986) [hereinafter
Yurow].
The other major international data protection agreement is the Organization for
European Cooperation and Development ("OECD") Guidelines Governing the Pro-
tection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data. This is a voluntary
agreement and has been approved by 23 of the 24 OECD countries, including the
U.S. The U.S. is implementing the agreement through the voluntary cooperation of
U.S. multinational corporations to formulate internal data protection policies.
75. COUNCIL OF EUROPE EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 74, art. 8, at 32.
76. Id. art. 14, at 35.
77. Id. art. 4, at 31.
78. See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
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party countries. 7 0
B. Differences Between United States and Foreign Privacy Laws
United States privacy laws operate differently than European data pro-
tection laws in several ways. First, European laws fully cover both the
public and private sectors, whereas United States privacy laws only par-
tially cover each sector.80 The Privacy Act only applies to the federal
public sector. Other statutes cover a few specialized areas of the United
States private sector,8 ' such as consumer credit,8 2 educational,8 3 and
financial institutions.8 4
Second, in Europe, strong, centralized data protection commissions
manage and enforce data protection laws;8 5 the United States has no
independent, central authority. OMB provides minimal oversight of the
Privacy Act and Congress requires the President to submit annual com-
pliance reports.8 6 Agencies responsible for the substantive regulation
of the private sector, such as the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal
Reserve System, and the Department of Education, enforce privacy stat-
utes in these private areas.8 7
Third, European laws generally protect all persons regardless of cit-
izenship or nationality, subject to certain exceptions such as national
security.8 8 The Austrian Data Protection Act, for example, defines the
persons protected by the act as "persons or personal companies." 8 9
France protects the right of access of "[a]nyone who can prove his iden-
tity." 9 0 Sweden's Data Act defines personal information as "informa-
79. COUNCIL OF EUROPE EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 74, art. 12.3.b, at 34.
See also Yurow, supra note 74, at 239-40.
80. Yurow, supra note 74, at 239-40.
81. Id. at 240-41.
82. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (1982).
83. See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g
(1982), as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-26, 93 Stat. 342.
84. See Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (1982).
85. Yurow, supra note 74, at 240.
86. Section 6 of the Public Law, known as the Privacy Act, which was not codified,
provides: "OMB shall develop guidelines and requirements for the use of agencies
in implementing [the Act] ... ; and provide continuous assistance to and oversight of
the implementation of the provisions ... by agencies." Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
579, at 6 (1982). See also 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o), (p) (1982). "The President shall annu-
ally submit to... [Congress] a report describing the actions of the Director of OMB;
... the exercise of individual rights of access; ... identifying changes in or additions
to systems of records; ... such other information concerning administration of this
section as may be necessary or useful to the Congress." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(p) (1982).
87. Turn, Privacy Protection and Seciity il Transuational Data Processing Systems, 16
STAN. J. INT'L L. 67, 76 (1980).
88. Id. at 67, 76.
89. See Federal Act of 18 Oct., 1978 on the Protection of Personal Data (Data
Protection Act), Budesgesetzblatt No. 565/1968, § 2.2 (Austria); see also DATA PRO-
TECTION LEGISLATION: AN INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTATION 9 (U. Dammann, 0.
Mallman, & S. Simitis eds. 1977) [hereinafter Data Protection Legislation].
90. French Draft Law on Informatics and Liberties, Article 27 (1976), reprinted in
DATA PROTECTION LEGISLATION, supra note 89, at 65. The French Draft Law was
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tion concerning an individual," with "individual" meaning any
person. 9 1
By defining their scope in terms of any person, European acts pro-
tect foreign nationals as well as citizens.9 2 In contrast, the Privacy Act
only applies to United States citizens and permanent residents, 9 3
although United States private sector laws extend to all persons.9 4
C. Similarities Between United States and Foreign Privacy Laws
Despite the differences noted above, several aspects of European legisla-
tion are similar to the American Privacy Act.9 5 First, like the Privacy
Act,96 European data protection acts provide much more than just indi-
vidual access to personal information; they provide ways for individuals
to challenge and amend personal data. For example, the French data act
creates "the right to question the departments or bodies responsible for
carrying out the various categories of automatic data processing... with
a view to ascertain whether the personal [datum] being processed covers
him and, if it does, obtaining a copy of it."'97
Second, the European acts limit the kinds of organizations that can
collect personal data and how they can collect it.98 Third, personal data
enacted in 1978. Act 78-17 of 6Jan., 1978 on Data Processing, Data Files and Indi-
vidual Liberties (France).
91. Data Act of 11 May, 1973 as amended on Jan. 19, 1977 (Sweden). See also DATA
PROTECTION LEGISLATION, supra note 89, at 130.
92. Turn, supra note 87, at 76.
93. Id. The Canadian Privacy Act, R.S.C. ch. 119, § 2 (1983), and Access to Infor-
mation Act, id. § I, also give rights of information access only to citizens and perma-
nent residents. Id. §§ 1.4(1), 2.12(1). See also DATA PROTECTION LEGISLATION, supra
note 89; Skelly, Data Protection Legislation in Canada, in 3 YEARBOOK OF LAW COM-
PUTERS & TECHNOLOGY 79, 90 (C. Arnold ed. 1987). But discussions at the parlia-
mentary committee considering the legislation indicated that Canada would grant
foreigners information access rights on a reciprocal basis with other countries. H.R.
REP. No. 455, supra note 62, at 33. The Canadian Privacy Act provides that the right
of access may be extented by regulation to non-citizens. R.S.C. ch. 111 § 2.12(3)
(1983). See also DATA PROTECTION LEGISLATION, supra note 89, at 90. Because the Act
created a Privacy Commissioner whose tasks are similar to the centralized European
data protection boards, see Hearings, supra note 36, at 211, it is less critical that Can-
ada extend its Privacy Act to all persons.
94. This demonstrates the anomaly of the Privacy Act's limited scope of protec-
tion. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 603(b) (1970) ("The term
'person' means an individual").
In some ways, United States privacy law is broader than its European equivalents.
United States law covers manual and automated record-keeping systems whereas
European laws protect only automated data. See Turn, supra note 87, at 76. More-
over, in the United States, many state constitutions provide further privacy
protection.
95. Turn, supra note 87, at 71. They both promote the principles that were first
outlined in a U.S. H.E.W. committee report and augmented by the Privacy Protection
Study Commission and the Council of Europe's resolutions on privacy rights. Id. at
71 nn.7-9.
96. See supra notes 7-20 and accompanying text.
97. Act 78-17 of 6Jan. 1978 on Data Processing, Data Files and Individual Liber-
ties § 27 (France).
98. Turn, supra note 87, at 71-76.
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can only be used for those purposes for which the government collected
it, unless prior knowledge or consent of the person is obtained.9 9
Fourth, record keeping organizations are restricted as to when they may
disclose personal data, and they must conform to legally enforceable
confidentiality obligations. Additionally, these organizations must
account for their record-keeping policies, practices, and systems, and
they must develop information management policies to ensure that per-
sonal data is current and accurate. They must also implement precau-
tions to prevent misuse of the data.10 0
IV. Analysis
A. The Privacy Act's Exclusion of Foreigners for All Purposes Is
Overbroad
The original Senate bill underlying the Privacy Act applied to foreigners
as well as citizens.10 1 The only explanation in the legislative history for
limiting the final Act's protections to citizens and permanent residents
was to "exempt [from] the coverage of the bill intelligence files and data
banks devoted solely to foreign nationals or maintained by the State
Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and other organizations
for the purpose of dealing with nonresident aliens and people in other
countries." 1 0 2 This narrow explanation does not support the final Act's
broad exclusion of all foreigners from Privacy Act access rights. Con-
gress could have drafted the Privacy Act so as to cover legitimate Con-
gressional foreign policy and national security concerns yet avoid a
blanket exclusion of all foreigners and aliens.
Since the legislative history specifically refers to intelligence files
and data banks maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA")
and the State Department, it appears that Congress' main reason for
excluding foreigners concerned national security. Such factors, how-
ever, are dealt with specifically in other sections of the Privacy Act. For
example, record systems maintained by the CIA are generally exempt
from the Act. 10 3 Classified "national defense and foreign policy" mater-
ials are similarly exempt from many of the Privacy Act's require-
ments. 10 4 These explicit national security exemptions distinguish
between foreigners and citizens. Blanket preclusion of foreigners from
all Privacy Act protection, therefore, unnecessarily excludes foreigners
99. Id.
100. Id. at 71, 73.
101. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 13-14. See generallv supra notes 36-41 and accom-
panying text.
102. SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY
IN FEDERAL GATHERING AND DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION, S. REP. No. 1183, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 232.
103. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(1) (1982). See 2 B. BRAVERMAN & F. CHETIVRYND, INFORMA-
TION LAw 820 (1985).
104. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(1) (1982). The classified materials exempted are those
falling within FOIA's exemption 1. 2 B. BRAVERMAN & F. CHETWRYND, supra note
103, at 824.
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without achieving any increase in national security. 0 5
An example of a potential problem for aliens not receiving the pro-
tections of the Privacy Act is raised by Congress' consideration, in con-
nection with the recent Immigration Act, of a requirement that all
persons in the United States carry an identification card. 10 6 The card,
designed to prevent the employment of illegal aliens, would be backed
up by a national personal information databank covering all persons
legally in the United States.' 0 7 Such a system carries significant risks of
misuse, since police and other government agencies could use stored
information to conduct investigations beyond the scope of investigating
illegal employment, including numerous inquiries concerning persons
legally in the United States. Nonresident aliens would be especially sus-
ceptible to abuse since they have no rights under the Privacy Act. In
sum, competing national concerns, such as security, are adequately pro-
tected without excluding foreigners from Privacy Act coverage.
B. The FOIA Is Not an Adequate Substitute for the Privacy Act
Foreigners' current ability to obtain access to agency files about them-
selves through the FOIA does not compensate for exclusion from Pri-
vacy Act protection. The two acts promote different goals and
subsequently provide fundamentally different protections.' 0 8 The
FOIA's goals are to create an open government, promote an informed
people, and prevent government corruption.' 0 9 Since these objectives
extend to all persons affected by government operations, the FOIA pro-
vides everyone with access to non-exempt agency files for any pur-
pose."10 The underlying principle is that, except for specific instances
of overriding national interest, the government should have nothing to
hide from anyone."1
In contrast, the Privacy Act deals with information that people have
provided about themselves which the government has collected. Failure
105. The Privacy Act's legislative history also indicates that neither the OMB nor
the State Department opposed certain extensions of the Privacy Act to foreigners.
During the 1983 House Oversight Hearings on the Privacy Act, questions arose
about the potential impact of proposed amendments to deny foreigners all rights
under the FOIA. See H. R. REP. No. 455, supra note 62, at 32. The OMB testified that
it had not considered whether such amendments would deprive foreigners of any
right to access government files. See supra note 70. The OMB also stated that if the
FOIA was so amended, the State Department would favor extending the Privacy Act
to foreigners; OMB stated that it would not oppose such an extension. See H.R. REP.
No. 455, supra note 62, at 33. See also Hearings, supra note 36, at 600.
106. Hearings, supra note 36, at 266 (Statement ofJohn Shatuck, National Legisla-
tion Director of the ACLU).
107. Id.
108. See Riley, What Is This Thing Called FOI?, in FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TRENDS
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1, 3 (T. Riley & H. Relyea eds. 1983). See also THE FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT AND THE PRIvACY ACT, H.R. REP. No. 793, 95th Gong., 1st Sess.
(1977).
109. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
110. See supra text accompanying note 24.
111. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
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to protect all persons from the misuse of personal data runs contrary to
the ideal of privacy protection. When the United States government col-
lects personal data from aliens or foreigners, or requires them to pro-
vide personal data to receive government benefits to which they are
entitled, the government ought to have a reciprocal duty to protect such
data under its laws.
As detailed above," 12 the Privacy Act provides many rights and pro-
tections beyond mere access to files about oneself. At present, foreign-
ers can obtain their personal data in agency files, but they have no
means of challenging the information. Foreigners are also denied the
Privacy Act's protection against agencies' misuse of file information by
applying it to purposes other than those for which it was collected. 113 If
an agency's use of the personal data injures a foreigner, he or she is
deprived of the Act's remedial measures.' 1 4 Without an independent
central authority overseeing agency use of data, exclusion from the Pri-
vacy Act's protections leaves foreigners dependent on the irrebuttable
good will and accuracy of the bureaucracy.
Recent proposals to exclude foreigners from the FOIA 1 5 increase
the need for amending the Privacy Act. The possibility of totally depriv-
ing foreign nationals and nonresident aliens of all rights to agency infor-
mation should be avoided by expanding the Privacy Act.
The Privacy Act is intended to be a comprehensive statement of fed-
eral confidentiality policy. Consequently, it should not force persons to
resort to the FOIA to achieve its objectives. The Act's exclusion of non-
resident aliens contradicts the spirit of the Act that privacy is a "personal
and fundamental right protected by the Constitution. ' 16 While aliens
do not receive the full protection of constitutional rights, they are not
uniformly deprived of all constitutional protections. 17 The Privacy Act
112. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text. For arguments against exclud-
ing foreigners from FOIA, see Relyea, 1odfving the Freedom of Information Act: Ideas and
Implications, in FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TRENDS IN THE INFORMATION AGE 54, 62-63
(T. Riley & N. Relyea eds. 1983).
116. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579 § 2(a)(4), 88 Stat. 1896 (1974).
117. In general, the U.S. Supreme Court has purported to apply strict scrutiny to
state classifications which disadvantage aliens. The Court defines aliens as non-citi-
zens. Aliens do meet some of the traditional requirements for suspect classification:
they are a discrete and insular minority that is politically powerless and have been
traditionally discriminated against. However, classification is not based on an immu-
table characteristic since they are eligible for citizenship.
In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the Court held that states cannot
deny aliens welfare benefits. The Court held that aliens were a discrete and insular
minority and thus applied strict scrutiny. The Court emphasized that aliens pay
taxes, which fund the welfare program, just like citizens. In Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634 (1973), the Court held that the state cannot bar aliens from state civil
service jobs.
Because of the federal government's exclusive responsibility for supervising immi-
gration, the Court reviews classifications by the federal government which discrimi-
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was intended to expand privacy law to address a new problem.
118
Therefore, the issue of whether the Privacy Act should be extended to
aliens and foreigners does not depend on whether they have a constitu-
tional right to privacy. Moreover, even though the Constitution does
not require foreigners to be protected under the Privacy Act,I1 9 there is
no reason to distinguish between citizens and foreigners for this aspect
of a statutorily created right to privacy. Singling out foreigners does not
serve any government interest that is not already adequately addressed
by the Privacy Act's specific exemptions.
C. International Implications
The processing of personal data should be considered at the interna-
tional level. International agreements on data flow are needed because
data processing is increasingly international in scope. 120 As the interna-
tional community becomes more interdependent, the need for harmoni-
nate against aliens with great deference, especially if the classification is made
directly by Congress or the President.
In Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), the Court upheld Congress' requirement
that aliens be permanent residents and have resided continuously in the U.S. for five
years to receive Medicare. The Court emphasized Congress' full power over immi-
gration, which justified some discriminations against aliens that might not be permit-
ted by the States. However, the Court also stressed that this was discrimination
between classes of aliens and not between aliens and citizens. Therefore, it was
essentially a political question requiring great judicial deference to Congress. The
Court did note "aliens and citizens alike are protected by the Due Process Clause,"
but "[i]n the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Con-
gress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens." 426
U.S. at 78-80.
In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), the Court struck down a fed-
eral regulation issued by the Civil Service Commission barring resident aliens from
federal civil servicejobs. But the Court did not decide whether such a ban, if enacted
by Congress, would be unconstitutional.
A commentator has argued that there should be a difference between discriminat-
ing against aliens before and after they have entered the U.S.:
In Matthews v. Dias, the Court refused to acknowledge the tension between
two basic facts: first, the reasons for treating alienage as a suspect classifica-
tion apply as forcefully to the federal government as to the states, and sec-
ond, the power to determine the standards of admission of aliens must
inevitably give rise to some power to regulate what aliens can and cannot do
in this country.... A condition subsequent on entry is very different from a
condition precedent precisely because its impact is felt by residents of the
United States, to whom the government has an obligation of fair dealing...
in compliance with the standards of the Constitution. [The Court's] repeated
insistence that Congress has plenary power to act against aliens in any way it
wants must be seen as an invitation to Congress to act capriciously and with-
out significant concern for the legitimate interests of resident aliens.
Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens fiom Discriminatori' Treatment by the National Government,
1977 Sup. CT. REV. 275, 336-38.
118. R. ALDRICH, PRIVACY PROTECTION LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, NTIA Report 82-98 (1982)), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 36, at 481,
490. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
120. See Comment, Transborder Data Flows: Problems with the Council of Enrope Conven-
lion, or Protecting Statesfi'om Protectionism, 4 Nw. J. Irr'L. L. & Bus. 601, 612 (1982).
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ous information-handling rules becomes greater.' 2 1 Nations are
becoming more dependent on recorded personal information for organ-
izational decisions affecting the rights, privileges, and benefits of mil-
lions of people.122 Accordingly, the United States Privacy Act should be
expanded to resemble European data protection acts. An international
consensus on fundamental principles for protecting personal data would
decrease the reasons for regulating the export of data and thereby
decrease the costs of international data transfers.' 23 Restrictions on
information flows can prohibitively increase the cost of doing business
or limit technological development. 12 4 United States companies are
information-dependent and can be harmed by other countries creating
information barriers.' 2 5
European nations are concerned that the United States provides
less data protection to foreigners than other countries.' 2 6 At the Pri-
vacy Act Oversight Hearings, Ronald Plesser, former general counsel to
the Privacy Protection Study Commission, stated: "[Many foreign]
countries . . .require that other countries to whom information about
their subjects may be transferred have equivalent levels of privacy pro-
tection. The Privacy Act of 1974 is not generally seen as satisfying these
requirements for equivalent protection because non-citizens or resident aliens
are excluded from its protections."' 2 7 Another witness stated that foreign
121. Metz, Pivacy Legislation: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 34 FED. BARJ. 311, 315
(1975). The U.S. is a signatory nation to the OECD Guidelines which state:
Recognizing... that automatic processing and transborder flows ot~personal
data create new forms of relationships among countries and require the
development of compatible rules and practices; that transborder flows of per-
sonal data contribute to economic and social development .... Determined
to advance the free flow of information between Member countries.... Rec-
ommends [t]hat Member countries endeavour to remove or avoid creating, in
the name of privacy protection, unjustified obstacles to transborder flows of
personal data.
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINES ON THE
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA 7 (1981). See
also Bing, Forsberg & Nygaard. Legal Problems Related to Transborder Data Flows, in AN
EXPLORATION OF LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES
81-82 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Information Com-
puter Communication Policy Series No. 8, 1983).
122. Metz, supra note 121.
123. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GUIDELINES
ON PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA 11, 18
(1980). Also, nations have a common interest in not tolerating areas where national
regulations on data processing can easily be circumvented. The concern is having
personal data re-exported to a country with inferior data protection. Id.
124. See H.R. REP. No. 455, supra note 62, at 30-31.
125. Id.
126. Hearings, supra note 36, at 248 (Statement of R. Plesser).
127. Id. at 247 (emphasis added). In developing these issues at the hearings, Ples-
ser stated:
The interaction of the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act also
creates an interesting situation in connection with foreign data information
acts.... [T]ransborder data flow is of great concern to... companies. Many
foreign countries have established data protection acts whose basic tenants
[sic] is the ability of individuals to see and copy records maintained in sys-
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nations would view any U.S. actions constricting existing protection to
foreigners-such as restricting the FOIA-as a form of discrimina-
tion. 1 2 8 If other nations sense a lack of comity on the part of the United
States, they may restrict their protection of U.S. citizens' privacy rights.
United States economic interests would be best served if Congress
extends the Privacy Act to foreigners. 129
National governments commonly transfer personal data for their
own administrative purposes, usually to obtain information not domesti-
cally available. International data transfers involving health data, law
enforcement, social welfare, and commercial regulation are common.130
These transfers may be hindered if the country's privacy law is inconsis-
tent with the laws of other countries.1 3 1 As noted above,13 2 foreign
countries may restrict the flow of this important information to the
United States since the Privacy Act does not protect personal data about
foreigners.
Another reason to expand the Privacy Act is so that it will conform
to the purpose of the Council of Europe Data Protection Convention
("Convention") "to secure in the territory of each party for every individ-
ual, whatever his nationality or residence, respect for his rights and funda-
mental freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with respect to
automatic processing of personal data relating to him ('data protec-
tion')."' 133 The Convention was developed in close cooperation with
OECD and the non-European member countries of OECD, including
the United States.' 3 4 Article 23 of the Convention allows the Council of
tems about themselves. These countries also require that other countries to
whom information about their subjects may be transferred have equivalent
levels of privacy protection. The Privacy Act of 1974 is not generally seen as
satisfying these requirements for equivalent protection becanse non-citizens or
resident aliens are excluded from its protections. The Freedom of Information Act
has been a saving grace for policy-makers since it knows no citizen limita-
tions. Foreign nationals may use the Act to obtain information about them
that may have been transferred to the United States from other countries.
FOIA has mitigated primarily European fears that Europeans in [the] United
States do not have equivalent privacy protections. It is interesting to note
that one of the goals of the Justice Department in seeking changes to the
FOIA is to eliminate the coverage of the FOIA for foreign nationals. I fear
that the change would create concern among those others in the world that
are following a more directed approach towards information policy and could
create some problems that may result in the restrictions of transborder data
flows.
Id. at 247-48 (emphasis added).
128. Hearings, supra note 36, at 251 (Statement of Professor Flaherty).
129. Grossman, Transborder Data Flow, Separating the Privacy Interests of Individuals and
Corporations, 4 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 26 (1982).
130. Id. at 8.
131. Id. at 8 n.17.
132. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
133. COUNCIL OF EUROPE EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 74, art. 1, at 29
(emphasis added).
134. Id. at 27. The U.S. was represented by an observer on the Council of
Europe's committee. Id. at 9.
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Europe to invite non-members to join the Convention.135 In order for
the United States to join the Convention, it must amend its Privacy Act
to conform to the Convention's provisions regarding foreigners.
The United States can benefit from becoming a party nation to the
Council of Europe's Data Protection Convention. The Convention's
goal is to facilitate data transfers by harmonizing often conflicting
national data protection laws. 13 6 The United States should strive to
meet the requirements of the Convention as it authorizes signatory
nations to restrict transborder data flows to non-signatory countries.' 37
The Convention holds the promise of eventually resolving data protec-
tion problems between nations. Uniform data handling practices would
protect personal data and promote international trade in data and data
processing services. 1 38
The Council of Europe has strongly urged the United States to
increase legal safeguards for foreigners concerning personal informa-
tion or face the prospect of European restrictions on the flow of per-
sonal data to the United States. 139 The United States Government
responded that United States law provides adequate safeguards for per-
sonal privacy. 140 Because information and data processing have
become economic commodities,14 ' United States privacy law must meet
generally accepted international standards to promote U.S. trade in
these areas. United States international trade in these areas amounts to
annual exports in excess of $30 billion as of 1983.142 Statistics are not
available concerning what percentage of this trade is covered by federal
privacy law,' 4 3 but even a relatively small percentage would result in a
significant total value. Since the United States is the world leader in
trade, much of which trade consists of or depends on data flows, any
restrictions on data transfers will affect United States business interests
more than those of other nations. 144 Expansion of the Privacy Act
would increase the opportunity for more data flow to the United States
and would benefit United States business.
V. Conclusion
The Privacy Act is the primary United States statute protecting the confi-
dentiality of information collected by the federal government. In order
to equally protect everyone affected by government data collection and
to promote the ideal of open government in the United States and
135. Id. art. 23.1, at 39.
136. Comment, supra note 120, at 603.
137. Yurow, supra note 74, at 241.
138. Grossman, supra note 129, at 31.
139. Hearings, supra note 36, at 272 (Statement ofJohn Shattuck).
140. Id.
141. Comment, supra note 120, at 601.
142. Hearings, supra note 36, Appendix 8, at 599.
143. Id. at 599-600.
144. Comment, supra note 120, at 604.
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abroad, foreign nationals and nonresident aliens should be treated the
same as United States citizens under the Privacy Act. This expansion of
the Privacy Act would bring it more in line with European data protec-
tion and would promote the flow of transborder data and benefit United
States commercial interests.
David C. Boyle

